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Abstract 
This article discusses the effects that constructions of lesbianism – generated and circulated 
widely throughout Anglo-American media – had on normative discourses of gender and 
sexuality amongst British migrants, living in the affluent coastal tourist town of Sitges, in 
Spain. Marketed as a cosmopolitan location par excellence, Sitges’ identity is built largely on 
its reputation for playing host to an internationally diverse gay community, subsequently 
understood to evince an atmosphere of openness and tolerance. And yet drawing on the 
work of Frantz Fanon (1952/1967) and Kelly Oliver (2001), I suggest that the visibility of 
feminine lesbianism in this context was resignified through those media images, constituting 
a ‘double misrecognition’, which saw all female homosexuality paradoxically become 
invisible at the exact moment representation was explicitly deemed to have been achieved. 
Far from elaborating a cosmopolitan ‘openness towards difference’, I argue that the 
resulting double misrecognition actually substantiated highly conservative gender norms, 
even as it masqueraded as the opposite.  
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Introduction 
December 2010 saw the worldwide release of Hollywood film director Darren Aronofsky’s 
eagerly anticipated psychological thriller Black Swan. The film’s story followed a ballerina 
forced to negotiate the machinations of her destructive, over-bearing mother; of a highly 
demanding, sexually manipulative director; and those of a mysterious, beautiful rival, as she 
fought her own rapidly spiralling mental disintegration to play the lead role in an adaptation 
of Swan Lake, for a prestigious New York ballet company. Black Swan was a box office hit, 
winning widespread critical acclaim and bagging numerous awards in the process, including 
five Oscars and four Golden Globes. 
 
Prior to its release however, Black Swan proved a hot topic of conversation for one reason in 
particular – the widely publicised inclusion of a sex scene between the two female leads, 
played by Hollywood actresses Natalie Portman and Mila Kunis. Previously, even the most 
remote intimation of lesbianism on screen would automatically result in a film receiving the  
highest possible certification. So it was with some surprise that Black Swan garnered only an 
‘R’ rating in the United States and the equivalent ‘15 with parental guidance’ rating in the 
UK. This was regarded in certain quarters as something of a coup and it was tentatively 
suggested that a more lenient certification offered not only evidence of an increasingly 
progressive attitude towards the cinematic representation of lesbianism, but consequently 
therefore, a greater public tolerance towards female homosexuality more generally too 
(Bendix, 2010). Perhaps unsurprisingly then, the scene came to play a central role in every 
interview with either actress. In one pre-Oscar interview with Natalie Portman, when asked 
about the scene, she replied: 
 
‘Everyone was so worried about who was going to want to see this movie . . . I 
remember them being like, ‘How do you get guys to a ballet movie? How do you get 
girls to a thriller?’ And the answer is a lesbian scene. Everyone wants to see that. 
(Entertainment Weekly, 2010) 
 Everyone wants to see a lesbian scene? What on earth could she mean? Did the 
mainstream popularity of the movie really occur for the reason that the actress was 
suggesting? Did this subsequently provide evidence of the rehabilitation of a once 
transgressive identity throughout Euro-American popular culture? Has lesbianism been so 
thoroughly culturally resignified that its representation is not only tolerated and acceptable, 
but is now a highly desirable, commoditised identity? Well here, I am going to argue, not 
quite. Instead, I suggest that it is a very particular kind of lesbianism that is being referred 
to, one that in seeming to suggest the transformation of female homosexuality into 
desirable mainstream icon of acceptable diversity, does not actually equate to lesbianism at 
all. And it is this particular articulation of female homosexuality, both evinced and 
concretised throughout Euro-American media representations – of which Black Swan offers 
a prime example – that I first became aware of during 12 months of ethnographic fieldwork 
amongst British migrants, living in the affluent coastal tourist town of Sitges, in Spain. 
 
Making places: Sitges and cosmopolitanism 
 
My fieldwork aimed to bring place-marketing ideas of cosmopolitanism into dialogue 
with a newly emerging sociology of ‘lifestyle migration’ (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009a, 2009b). 
Lifestyle migration has been defined as the increasing relocation ‘of [relatively affluent] 
people within the developed world’ (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009b: 608), which has ‘grown as 
a result of very particular historical and material conditions, particularly globalisation, 
increased mobility, flexibility, and increased relative wealth’, that have often been 
overlooked in the ‘more general literature on migration’ (Benson and O’Reilly, 2009b: 609, 
620). To do so, I planned to focus on the way that subjective differences were negotiated 
within a context in which identities that might previously have been negatively-valued 
bases of inequality, like homosexual identities, for example, were supposedly equally highly-
valued. Whilst it soon became clear that homosexuality especially was seen by the British 
participants with whom I worked as a celebrated marker of progressive cosmopolitanism, it 
was precisely that recognition itself, and the form that its representation took, which 
formed the basis of social exclusion in a way that I had completely unanticipated. 
 
Sitges lies on the Eastern coast of the Spanish mainland, around 35 kilometres South of 
Barcelona, deep in the heart of Catalunya. The town is perhaps most famous for its 
reputation for being cosmopolitan, for being a place where ‘anything goes’, a line that it is 
heavily marketed along. Sitges, you never cease being told, is different. It is an idea that 
confronts you everywhere you go, and not least because Sitges’ locational identity has been 
explicitly, and not to mention very successfully, constructed as such through the efforts of 
the local Ayuntamiento (town council). Within their promotion of the town, the 
Ayuntamiento have consciously built upon macro-level shifts in place-marketing discourses, 
which from the 1990s onwards saw a new emphasis placed on ‘cosmopolitanism’ 
(Rushbrook, 2002: 183; see also Binnie et al., 2006: 28; Young et al., 2006: 1687). 
 
The ideological origin of cosmopolitanism is most often traced back to the Ancient Greek 
philosopher, Diogenes, who, in the 5th century B.C. when asked where he came from, is said 
to have replied ‘I am a citizen of the world’ (cited in Nussbaum, 1994: 2). Diogenes refused 
to be bound by his immediate locality, instead claiming allegiance to a humanity reaching 
far beyond it. This concept was more fully developed by the Stoics, who argued that 
attachments to locality and in particular, to the City State, which had been central to 
Ancient Greek formations of citizenship and [masculine] identity, led only to enslavement 
(Breckenridge et al., 2002: 10; Nussbaum, 1994: 3; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002: 12). 
Contemporary accounts most often suggest that after a hiatus during the Reformation, 
when philosophy was taken over by debates opposing the secular and the religious, 
Enlightenment-based thinking returned to the concept of cosmopolitanism principally 
through Kant, whose famous essay Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay (Kant, 
1795/2010), built on the ideas of Diogenes and his followers (Breckenridge et al., 2002: 10; 
Nussbaum, 1994: 3).  
 
Kant believed that the then contemporary extension of global trade he bore witness to, 
necessitated the maintenance of similarly global ‘good relations’; relations which reached 
beyond geographically bound, territorially-defined, nation-states (Kant, 1795/2010; 
Nussbaum, 1994: 3; Vertovec and Cohen, 2002: 12). In order to function peaceably, Kant 
argued, they would need to be established on the basis of a new juridical category to run 
alongside the continuation of Statist rule – cosmopolitan rights distributed via a world 
citizenship (Kant, 1795/2010: 57; Waldron, 2000: 228–30). Interest in the concept then 
waned somewhat until its contemporary resurgence, but since then, different disciplines 
have explored it in different ways.  
 
While political philosophy for example, has run along the lines of a Kantian model of 
cosmopolitanism as a liberalist world citizenship, sociology has tended towards a 
cosmopolitanism emphasising the impact of globalisation on links between state and society 
(Mitchell, 2007: 2). Within anthropology, cosmopolitanism emerged, at least in part, 
through work considering transnational migration (Mitchell, 2007: 3). Competing critiques 
and definitions have proliferated, from evoking an elitist, ‘unrooted’ cosmopolitanism, one 
supposedly constituting an intellectualised ‘aesthetic stance’ (Hannerz, 1990: 239), to a 
‘subaltern’ cosmopolitanism, propounding a ‘bottom up’, ‘vernacular ethnic rootedness’ in 
opposition, one that need not automatically ‘negate openness to cultural difference or the 
fostering of a universalist civic consciousness and a sense of moral responsibility beyond the 
local’(Werbner, 2006: 497; see also Appiah, 1998). 
 
Whilst there is not the space to discuss all of these different positions and the nuances 
between them in greater detail here, perhaps the most important point to emerge from  
these debates has been recognition of the fact that both ‘groups and individuals perform 
their own sense of cosmopolitanism dependent on context – their own particular locations 
in various axes of power, as well as the broader structuring forces of global capitalism and 
geo-politics’ (Mitchell, 2007: 9). Rather than contingent forms of distinct capitalisms, it is 
precisely these ‘broader structuring forces’ of global capitalism, which have informed the 
specific articulation of cosmopolitanism that has proved vital to its association with place-
marketing (Rushbrook, 2002: 187). This has particularly been the case within so-called 
‘second-cities’, like Manchester (UK), Toronto and so on – those that lie outside of the more 
widely recognised centres of global trade and finance, like London, New York, or Tokyo 
(Binnie et al., 2006: 3). Being able to articulate a cosmopolitan identity through emphasising 
an openness towards ethnic and cultural diversity, usually by focusing on art and cultural 
activities, has been crucial to these restructured notions of place-marketing as urban 
developers seek to characterise locations ‘as cosmopolitan as a way of attracting ‘‘global 
talent’’, financial capital and tourism’ (Glick Schiller et al., 2011: 402).  
 
In this formulation, cosmopolitanism has come to represent ‘one of the most desirable 
forms of contemporary cultural capital’, becoming a fully explicit angle of urban 
regeneration in the process (Rushbrook, 2002: 183; see also Binnie et al., 2006: 28; Young et 
al., 2006: 1687). The notion that places can be ‘cosmopolitan’ has subsequently become 
part of Western vernacular, a representation which imagines specific locations as enabling 
the kinds of ‘exciting encounters with difference’ seen as being vital to attract, foster and 
retain the so-called ‘creative classes’; those people both able and willing to negotiate such 
encounters, those deemed perhaps, to be the most likely to live cosmopolitan lifestyles 
already (Young et al., 2006: 1687, 1689; Binnie et al., 2006: 3, 24).1  
 
The concept of ‘difference’ in this sense is crucial, because being tolerant of, being able to 
live with such ‘differences’ is understood to represent an ability to adapt, to be open to 
innovation and novelty, not only at the level of those relating individuals, but subsequently 
therefore, at the level of (socio)economic production too (Binnie et al., 2006: 2). Indeed, it 
was forcefully argued by Richard Florida, one of the main architects behind the proliferation 
of this idea and its adoption by urban planners in sites across the world, that the ‘creative 
classes’ – young, trendy and politically progressive people, working in high-tech and/or 
creative industries, would be at the forefront in the 21st century, as ‘creativity’ (loosely 
defined) would become the driver of economic growth (Florida, 2002, 2005). 
 
Critics have since questioned the validity of Florida’s claims, arguing that places in which his 
ideas directly influenced urban planning and social policy – Detroit in the USA, for example, 
have seen little benefit and that it is in fact the other way around; the so-called creative 
classes are drawn to areas of high economic growth, rather than being the reason for it 
(Boren and Young, 2013; Hansen and Niedomysl, 2009; Markusen, 2006). Nonetheless, 
there are places that have undoubtedly benefitted from the incorporation and extension of 
such beliefs, and in terms of successful place-marketing especially, cosmopolitanism has 
subsequently become commoditised, something to be consumed (Beck, 2004: 150). 
 
Sitges in particular was well-placed to take advantage of these shifts for several reasons 
mobilised in its place-marketing; its artistic history following its prominence as a location 
within the late 19th century Catalan modernist movement; its proximity to Barcelona – a 
city renowned for its own cosmopolitan credentials; the relatively large and highly diverse 
migrant community it has attracted; as well as the town’s enduring indigenous ‘Sitgetan’ 
community conveyed most strongly through a strict adherence to an annual calendar full of 
traditional fiestas and carnivals. But Sitges’ cosmopolitanism, its difference, has crucially 
also been an identity built upon its reputation for playing host to one group in particular: 
a highly prominent and internationally mixed gay community. This has proven to be such a 
vital part of the story of Sitges not least because increasingly within cosmopolitan place-
marketing discourses, alternative sexual identities have in one sense become conflated with 
ethnicity, so that the claim to embrace sexual diversity constitutes a highly-valued example 
of embracing cultural/ethnic diversity more generally, so that ‘gay culture occupies a pivotal 
role within the production and consumption of urban spaces as cosmopolitan’ (Binnie 
and Skeggs, 2004: 40; see also Brown, 2006: 133; Rushbrook, 2002: 183).2  
 
The flaunting of tolerance towards sexual diversity has not only proved vital to the 
marketing of particular locations, but the successful re-branding of places achieved on this 
basis has extended beyond specific locations by linking them to wider regions across the 
world (Giorgi, 2002: 57). The idea that acceptance of homosexuality functions as an index of 
modernity in this narrative fits neatly into a broad neoliberal ideology that values 
cosmopolitan credentials, because it is (ideologically at least) at once able to make a place 
particular and thereby act as a form of cultural capital, whilst at the same time be 
positioned as a transnational form of identification linking people and places across both 
space and time. In order for this to have occurred, it means that, within this particular 
discourse, homosexuality has been rendered explicit, made visible and to some extent, both 
ideologically and legislatively normalised. It was without a doubt the single most important 
aspect of the claim that participants, as well as its place-marketing, made for Sitges’ 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
The gay community in Sitges is both prominent and highly visible; rainbow flags hang from 
shop fronts, posters advertising gay nightclubs adorn the walls and during high season when 
gay tourism especially reaches its peak, the sheer numbers of men wandering the streets of 
the town holding hands or being intimate in, well, other ways, shall we say, are impossible 
to ignore. As is the acceptability of such visibility, the freedom they possess to do so. It is 
precisely the fact of homosexuality being rendered explicitly visible that was understood, 
not least by the Britons with whom I worked, to convey an atmosphere of openness and 
tolerance constituting Sitges’ ‘difference’ as a location, making it more than merely a ‘place’, 
but signifying an entire way of being. It soon became clear however, that gay men were very 
much primus inter pares and that although relatively a tiny minority, lesbians (as much as 
imaginings about them) occupied a strange space for the British migrants with whom I 
worked. Inside cosmopolitan homosexuality being gay and being a lesbian were ultimately 
very different indeed. 
 
Negotiating homosexuality: Gender inversion and ‘authenticity’ 
 
One afternoon soon after I arrived, I was in a bar run by an Englishman. As we were chatting 
I asked him about the place across the street. It was evidently a gay bar – rainbow flags 
draped either side of the entrance – but the doors and windows were covered with what 
looked like heavy, dark, velvet, and it was one of the few places which was impossible to see 
inside. I had been meaning to call in, but as I was still trying to find my feet, I wanted to 
check that it would not cause a potential 
problem: 
 
‘Do you think they’d mind me going in there? The gay guys, would they mind 
[I nodded towards the bar across the road], in there?’ 
 
Bob was wiping down the bar top. In reply, he stopped, put one hand on his hip and 
flapped the other, which was holding the dishcloth, at the wrist. Affecting an ‘effeminate’ 
voice, he replied: 
 
‘Not in there, they love women!’ 
 
Flapping his hand back and forth even more he coquettishly pursed his lips. I couldn’t help 
but laugh at the unexpected and slightly incongruous sight of him playing ‘camp’. 
 
‘Seriously?’ I asked. ‘They wouldn’t mind?’ 
 
He reverted to his usual way of being. 
 ‘No, no, you’ll be fine. They love women . . . ’ 
 
He went back to wiping down the bar top. 
 
‘ . . . it’s lesbians they can’t stand.’ 
 
Lesbians and women were then, it seemed, two entirely separate species. Regardless 
of the reality, not once did anybody, during the entire fieldwork period, raise the possibility 
that gay men were anything other than ‘camp’ or effeminate. Lesbianism, on the other 
hand, was fundamentally split into two separate positions; one deemed to be ‘authentic’ by 
participants – the masculine or ‘butch’ lesbian, whilst the other, the feminine lesbian, was 
deemed ‘inauthentic’ – and, not merely by default. To be an ‘authentic’ lesbian was 
absolutely fundamental to participants’ conceptualisations of female homosexuality and 
relied upon being understood to be physically a woman, whilst externalising what were 
culturally regarded as being masculine traits; taken together this signalled an exclusively 
homosexual orientation. Again and again ‘lesbian’ and ‘masculinity’ were firmly 
conflated.  
 
As one participant informed me: 
 
‘I’ve read research that, there’s this research, I can’t remember where, but it showed 
that gay men and women, in their brains, are closely related chemically and men are 
with lesbians. Err . . . straight men with lesbians I mean! [He laughed.] They did this 
research and it showed that, it’s this part of the brain, lesbians have it like straight 
men, it’s why they’re more aggressive. So it’s not so much about who you want to have 
sex with, it’s more about chemicals in the brain. I mean, why do you think it’s always 
lesbians fighting in gay bars? It’s never the gay men, always the lesbians fighting, gay 
men never fit that bill!’ 
 
I asked him: 
‘But . . . what about feminine lesbians, ones who aren’t so masculine, I mean? Do you 
think they’re not really lesbians, not in the same way?’ 
 
‘Well, I think . . . I do think that butch lesbians are more real, definitely, yeah. But then 
what’s interesting, is to think about why they choose that image, why do they do that? 
Like I said, it’s about chemicals in the brain and what-have-you. But . . . it’s difficult. I 
don’t . . . I mean, I guess the feminine ones, they’ve never really had an identity in the 
same way. I mean, ok, in the 90s you had lipstick lesbians for a bit, but it never really 
took off. I mean, I guess it’s maybe that those lesbians don’t really need an identity, 
you know? Not in the same way, because it’s more natural isn’t it? Women can hold 
hands, two girls can hold hands, they can be intimate in that way with each other and 
no-one bats an eyelid do they? If two men do it, well . . . ’ 
 
‘What, it’s like, more radical or something, in a way you mean, two men?’ I asked. 
 
‘In a way, yeah, exactly. But I think that it’s also more that lipstick lesbianism kind of 
segued into, well, people could get into it who hadn’t been part of the scene before 
because they didn’t conform to that image, like I was talking about earlier. It became 
like, it wasn’t only for butch lesbians. It definitely helped that the scene became, you 
know, there were cafes and bars, it was about a lifestyle, it was cleaner and brighter, it 
wasn’t just all about sex . . . ’ 
 
Butch lesbians in this formulation, are more ‘real’; their sexual identity was’ understood by 
participants, in other words, to equate to an exclusive homosexuality which was 
subsequently deemed to be authentically so. They chose to express a masculine identity, 
but at the same time it was not really a choice at all because it was ‘chemicals in the brain’ 
that determined it. But although ‘butch’ lesbianism was a ‘real’ identity in this context, it 
was also definitively working class, which precluded it from being able to articulate or make 
cosmopolitanism legible in this context. Feminine lesbianism had a peak, this participant 
suggested, in the 1990s, but it was not a real identity because it was not about ‘chemicals in 
the brain’, it was not even about sex. Instead, it was a lifestyle choice, one able to build on 
that supposedly natural inclination women have to go to clean, brightly-lit cafes and hold 
hands with one another. 
It has been argued that this tendency to link masculinity and female homosexuality is long-
established, and that across Euro-American culture the idea holds so fast that, regardless of 
actual sexual identification, any woman deemed to be masculine is automatically 
categorised as a lesbian (Faderman, 1991: 41; Halberstam, 1998: 52, 59). Conflating female 
masculinity with lesbianism in this way not only denies the fact that there may well be 
female masculinities that cannot be so easily equated with non-normative sexuality, but 
also underwrites the idea that properly constituted masculinity is tied in an essential way to 
the male body (Halberstam, 1998: 46). And as the quotes above show, this idea was 
certainly prevalent amongst the people with whom I worked.  There is also, of course, a 
wide range of literature that explores butch–femme identities, but most often in relation to 
one another.3  Here, I have chosen not to introduce this literature because the aim of the 
article is to analyse the way that the participants with whom I worked conceptualised 
masculinised and feminised female homosexual identities in opposition to one another, 
instead. 
 
To do so, I focus on a feminised form of lesbianism ‘constructed in relation to 
heterosexuality not as an autonomous or independent sexual identity’ (Gill, 2009: 
152–3). Feminine lesbians represented in this way ‘denote heterosexual women 
‘‘experimenting’’ . . . with other women. Girl-on-girl action is presented as exciting, 
fun, but, crucially, as entirely unthreatening to heterosexuality’ (Gill, 2009: 153; emphasis 
added; see also Diamond, 2005; Wilkinson, 1996). And it was precisely this trope of the 
overtly-sexualised ‘hot-but-non-threatening’ feminine lesbian that constituted the only 
means through which the participants with whom I worked could comfortably discuss 
lesbianism. Clearly something interesting was going on, something that I wanted to try to 
understand. I asked one participant how she imagined lesbians. She mouthed with 
a grimace that lesbians were ‘butch’: 
 
‘So, if I showed you a picture of, say, Shakira4, and said ‘‘She’s gay’’, you wouldn’t 
believe me?’ 
 
‘Ah well, Shakira? She isn’t a good choice is she? She’s filthy!’5  
 
‘What about . . . Jennifer Aniston?’6  
 
‘Actually, I probably wouldn’t believe that either because I know so much about her 
history of failed relationships with men.’ 
 
‘What about if they were posing together, like properly together, on a magazine cover, 
would you think they were gay then?’ 
 
‘I don’t think I would, no. Because it’s . . . you’re used to that aren’t you? I probably 
wouldn’t even notice it, to be honest!’ 
 
‘You wouldn’t think they were lesbians?’ 
 
‘No, no I wouldn’t. I think, two women together, two hot women, that’s kind of . . . I think of 
that as being, well, a bit saucy, you know?!’ 
 
‘Why?’ I asked. 
 
‘It’s like it’s hot . . . ’ she said, ‘ . . . but it’s not really real.’ 
 
Representations of feminine women hinting at sexual intimacy proliferated to such an 
extent, she argued, that it was easy to overlook. It certainly did not equate in participants’ 
everyday imaginings to an exclusively homosexual identity, but functioned instead as a kind 
of ‘sexy’ addendum to female heterosexuality. As I will discuss below in relation to the 
town’s first ever gay Pride event, it was simultaneously the proliferation of such images 
throughout Sitges’ place marketing, which was seen to augment the town’s cosmopolitan 
credentials by operating precisely as evidence of the acceptance of female homosexuality, 
which was then thoroughly taken for granted. And it was this very contradiction which had a 
discernible impact on how feminine lesbianism could – or more correctly perhaps could not 
– be lived as an embodied identity within the town. Because in this context what you looked 
like was read through the terms of the normative gender paradigm to unfailingly define 
what you are, what Halberstam has called the cardinal rule of gender remained firmly fixed  
in place – one had to be ‘readable’, that is, ‘at a glance’ (Halberstam, 1998: 23). 
Consequently, as the quotes outlined above have shown, to be read normatively as a 
woman – to be feminine – and yet to express same-sex desire, was not to be recognised as 
authentically and exclusively homosexual, but was instead to be re-imagined as an overtly 
sexualised extension of female heterosexuality. 
 
The sexualisation of (necessarily feminised) lesbian representations has been discussed 
before; Blackman, for example, has suggested that this ‘heterosexualised’ lesbian image has 
come to proliferate at a time when flexibility is paramount, helping to ‘construct an image 
of the heterosexual woman . . . as flexible and open to change, with the rigid lesbian who 
clings to her so-called pigeonholed labels as dreary and restricted’ (Blackman, 2009: 130). 
This ‘hetero/lesbian’ figure, Blackman argues, purports to offer women a form of agency in 
a postfeminist world wherein the ‘heterosexual woman tries lesbianism whilst waiting for a 
man who is good enough’ (Blackman, 2009: 125, 128–9). The crucial factor here being that 
as ‘much as they can come out, they can always go back in’ again; lesbianism operates as a 
‘temporary interruption to the solid and indomitable march of heterosexual desire’, which 
remains privileged amongst all else (Blackman, 2009: 125; see also Rubin, 1982; Vance, 
1982: 282). The distinction this then creates has direct effects on how people are able to 
embody or actualise their sense of self and personhood; the butch lesbian becomes ‘the 
shadowy Other’ in this context, fully-fixed into that classification and denied agency through 
it (Ciasullo, 2001; see also Blackman, 2009: 131; Gill, 2009: 152; Skeggs, 2004: 292–3). 
 
And yet it has also been suggested that such representations are not necessarily wholly 
negative and may perhaps ‘open up a potentially positive and ‘‘hospitable’’ space for some 
– particularly white, middle-class and femme – lesbians in popular culture’ (Dittmar, 1998; 
Gill, 2009: 152). But what none of these positions explicitly consider is the position of the 
feminine lesbian who proclaims an either/or identity – what of the feminine lesbian who is 
not heteroflexibly inclined? It is my contention then, that the feminine lesbian is as equally 
fixed, equally ‘Othered’ by those representations, precisely because her sexuality is not 
deemed to be an authentic or ‘stand-alone’ identity; shadowless and invisible behind the 
‘shadowy Other’ precisely through being read – and only read – as the heterosexual, neo-
liberal, flexible adventurer. This was crucial, and not least because all ‘sexualities are socially 
negotiated’ (Weston, 2009: 142). But in a context like Sitges, where the visibility of 
celebrated – and especially sexual – differences was privileged, being able to have 
one’s sexuality be successfully read formed the basis of social participation within the town. 
And it is in this sense that I will argue that feminine lesbianism offers a clear-cut case of 
‘double misrecognition’ (Oliver, 2001: 38), which led to what participants 
 felt was the exclusion of lesbian participation in the town’s first ever gay Pride festival. But 
first, we need to take one step back to look at misrecognition itself, misrecognition as 
described particularly by the philosopher Charles Taylor. 
 
Charles Taylor and ‘The Politics of Recognition’ 
 
Taylor had been fascinated by the rise of identity-based politics following the tide of 
counter-cultural, civil rights, feminist and anti-war movements that swept across the 
Western world from 1968 onwards, and in 1994 he published a famous essay, ‘The Politics 
of Recognition’ (Taylor, 1994). In it, Taylor argued that to be afforded positive recognition 
was a fundamental right, the denial of which constituted a potent form of oppression that 
he termed ‘misrecognition’ and famously described as: 
 
‘The thesis . . . that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often 
by the misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real 
damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a 
confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Non-recognition or 
misrecognition can be a form of oppression’ (Taylor, 1994: 75) 
 
Taylor’s engagement with political-philosophical theories of recognition was incredibly 
influential and sparked a resurgence of work considering its themes. One of Taylor’s main 
interlocuters was Nancy Fraser, whose major criticism was that articulations of recognition 
like those of Taylor’s had the tendency to airbrush out conflicts over redistribution (Fraser, 
1997, 2000). Where for Taylor all conflicts, including those concerning economic 
maldistribution, were best understood as iterations of struggles for recognition more 
generally, Fraser argued that while identity politics and claims for more equitable economic 
redistribution are ‘fundamental to social justice’, they are nonetheless ‘irreducible to each 
other’ (McNay, 2008:66)7 . In essence, Fraser argued that Taylor’s ‘subjectivist’ approach 
ignored structurally-determined, material inequalities. Furthermore, she suggested that 
when identity-based neo-Hegelian approaches to recognition were taken, matters of 
economic redistribution were displaced on the basis of a reified conception of (both 
collective and individual) identity (Fraser, 1997: 112; 2000: 108, 110). Such simplistic, reified 
understandings of identity were problematic, not least because they were built on a unitary 
understanding of the self that overlooked the multiplicity of identities that each individual 
embodies in different contexts at different times (Fraser, 1997: 152). 
 
For Fraser, the answer lay in (heuristically, at least) separating out oppression based on 
identitarian misrecognition from that of economic maldistribution. She then outlined two 
distinct types of remedy: the ‘affirmative’, aimed at ameliorating inequalities post-facto, 
thereby maintaining the system/structure that produced them, as opposed to the 
‘transformative’, which aimed instead to correct inequalities precisely through altering the 
system/structure itself (Fraser, 1997: 15, 23; see also McNay, 2008: 147; Oliver, 2001: 50). 
Fraser cited political debates concerning homosexuality as a concrete example of the 
differences between the two approaches, so that gay-identity politics, aiming to revalue gay 
and lesbian identities, are what Fraser would call ‘affirmative’ (Fraser, 1997: 23). Queer 
politics, on the other hand, in seeking to undermine the heteronormative opposition 
between homo/heterosexuality completely, thereby deconstructing categorical distinctions 
based on sexuality for everybody, would be ‘transformative’ (Fraser, 1997: 24)8 . Political 
issues of recognition could subsequently be resignified as struggles over ‘status’ (McNay, 
2008: 148; Fraser, 1997: 11–12; 2000: 107). 
 
In one sense both authors were writing about recognition at the level of macrolevel political 
discourse and particularly in relation to ideas about multiculturalism, which had become 
newly prominent from the beginning of the 1990s. Nonetheless, they were also sensitive to 
the fact that such ideological manoeuvres bear real material weight, and affect the way that 
people are either enabled to, or prevented from, living their everyday lives. Recognition, in 
the aforementioned quote from Taylor, operates, in other words, both at the level of State 
legislation as much as it is constituted by inter-subjective interactions between people on a 
micro-level; a shift across scale that very definitely resonated within Sitges too. People 
negotiated their social relationships, recognised or related to one another according to the 
different categories, those representations of ‘acceptable’ differences, upon which Sitges’ 
cosmopolitan discourse had been explicitly and consciously built. Despite the all-inclusive 
rhetoric that Sitges’ cosmopolitanism suggested, there were very definitely those defined 
within Sitges’ cosmopolitan discourse as ‘non-cosmopolitan’ – people deemed unable to 
reflect the kind of highly valued diversity through which cosmopolitanism here was 
constituted.  
 
Amongst the British migrants with whom I worked – and undoubtedly reflecting the 
material representation of Sitges-as-cosmopolitan within the town’s place-marketing 
material – these non-cosmopolitans were written out of the discourse according to (often 
overlapping) categories of race and class. In Taylor’s terms these constituted concrete forms 
of misrecognition; certain groups of people who were being prevented from being able to 
contest negative representations of themselves, or were denied positive recognition in the 
first place. And yet in another sense, these groups were, nonetheless, still thereby defined. 
Forming the ‘constitutive outside’, they were, in other words, the negation through which 
cosmopolitanism was here delineated (Butler, 1993: 13). Whilst not wishing to downplay 
the challenge this posed to the belief that in Sitges all subjective differences would be not 
only tolerated, but positively celebrated, by focusing on the imaginings and representations 
of lesbianism here, I want to suggest that another form of misrecognition can be added to 
the debate; one that relates directly to the work of Frantz Fanon, and Kelly Oliver’s own 
reading of his work. 
 
Fanon, Oliver and ‘double misrecognition’ 
 
Taylor’s neo-Hegelian formulation of recognition outlined above, clearly owes a debt to 
Frantz Fanon and perhaps his most famous work – The Wretched of the Earth (Fanon, 1963). 
In it, Fanon argued that, within colonial contexts, the imposition of the dominant colonisers’ 
image of the colonised gets internalised by the colonised themselves, so that it becomes a 
potent tool of oppression allowing dominant groups to ‘entrench their hegemony by 
inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated’ (Taylor, 1994: 97; Fanon, 1963). Yet it is 
to his earlier work, Black Skin, White Masks, the premise of which foreshadowed The 
Wretched of the Earth, that I turn to here (Oliver, 2001: 38; see Fanon, 1952/1967).  
 
In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon drew on his own experiences of living as a black man in 
the ‘white’ world of Paris in the early 1950s, as he sought to bring together both social and 
psycho-analytical understandings of recognition. Specifically Lacanian elaborations of 
recognition – built out of Hegelian foundations – rely, Fanon argued, on the belief that the 
alienation resulting from a split between the inner psychic world and the outer world of 
society, is constitutive of subjectivity, the means through which the ego gains agency, 
however illusory that may be (Fanon, 1952/1967). What they cannot account for, however, 
is what Kelly Oliver in her engagement with Fanon labels the ‘double misrecognition’ 
experienced particularly by victims of racism (Oliver, 2001: 38). 
 
For Fanon the defining moment comes, perhaps, when he is on a train in Paris. Across the 
carriage he sees a small child grasp his mother’s hand more tightly, draw himself into her 
body more closely, fix him with a wide-eyed stare and cry ‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m 
frightened!’ (Fanon, 1952/1967: 112). In that child’s gaze Fanon finds not the alienation 
constitutive of his subjective identity, but encounters a kind of reverse mirror stage; in that 
child’s gaze he recognises a secondary effect; that there is no place of loving acceptance in 
the world that surrounds him. And so Fanon argues, for the oppressed, as the dominant 
culture demands that they identify with the position of ‘other’, the result is melancholia, 
‘the cultural loss of their own lovable and loved ego’ (Oliver, 2001:37). It is a double 
misrecognition, which becomes crystallised in that moment when an individual gains 
recognition of himself through the eyes of the dominant culture – precisely through which 
he is explicitly ‘Othered’ in the first place. White domination leaves Fanon with a choice to 
make in order to exist at all; identify with a whiteness he can never fully inhabit, put on the 
white mask, or recognise himself as black and internalise the dominant culture’s negative 
representation of himself; become inferiority, that is, incarnate (Fanon, 1952/1967: 18, 34–
5, 100). 
 
I am not seeking, of course, to equate the position of a black man living with the legacies of 
colonialism in 1950s Paris and living contemporarily as a feminine lesbian in an affluent 
Spanish coastal tourist town. What I am arguing is that the choice that double 
misrecognition precipitates, the selection it demands, does in some respects resonate with 
the paradox the feminine lesbian was forced to face in the context of Sitges. And it does so 
precisely because Sitges’ locational identity as cosmopolitan was predicated on a system of 
representation, which meant that successful participation in the community relied on 
positive recognition being attained. And yet despite the fact that at first glance it seemed 
that there may well have been a place of acceptance, a form of positive recognition in the 
world that surrounded the feminine lesbian in Sitges, it was, I am arguing, nonetheless 
based on a double misrecognition, one that left her with a choice to make; embody the 
identity read off her body at the price of forfeiting legitimacy – or accept the cultural norms 
which demanded she externalise and make her authentic self legible through stylised  
masculinity with all of the negative connotations that entailed. 
 
As what was understood by participants to be authentic lesbianism – that is to be an 
exclusively homosexually-orientated woman who outwardly expressed this identity through 
stylised forms of normative masculinity – was denied the ability to represent, the kind of 
feminine lesbianism perpetuated and concretised through media representations has, I am 
suggesting, come to stand throughout mainstream Euro-American culture as the defining 
image of lesbian visibility, the image that shows equality has been achieved and how 
tolerant a society has become. Subsequently, it was an image that also contained the power 
to legitimate claims to cosmopolitanism in the town in which I worked, constituting the lens 
through which people understood lesbianism more generally. And nowhere was this clearer 
than in relation to Sitges’ first ever gay Pride event. 
 
Sitges gay Pride and lesbian non-participation 
 
I remember feeling surprised when I heard that Sitges had never held a gay Pride event 
before, despite its reputation, But when I mentioned this to participants, they quickly 
argued that the reason was simple: 
 
‘I don’t think you need Pride parades anymore. I mean really, what’s the big deal? 
I don’t think people care, especially not here’ (Alastair, retiree) 
‘I don’t see why they even need to have one here, Pride is supposed to be to fight for 
equality, it’s [homosexuality] already accepted here, you don’t need Pride’ (Hans, 
businessman) 
 
Participants overwhelmingly believed that Pride events were supposed to be political. In 
Sitges, it was argued, homosexuals supposedly had equality, so there was simply no need. 
Soon, however, the following pictures (see Figures 1 and 2) began to appear as marketing 
for the event, both online and on posters around the town: 
 
This type of marketing – meant to represent an openness towards and/or encourage lesbian 
participation in Sitges Pride – was redolent of that found throughout the town’s place-
marketing. Such images either contained pictures of overtly sexualised women who were 
read by participants as being feminine, or no depictions of women at all; particularly not 
those who could be read by participants as being ‘authentic’ lesbians. And as a result, 
participants – both lesbian and non – began to express ambivalence, beyond the idea that 
Pride was not politically necessary. One prominent gay businesswoman who lived in the 
town had contacted the event organisers to complain: ‘I told him, the two girls advertising 
the Girl’s Night Out are ridiculous! I bet they’re just models. They’re probably not even gay, 
they don’t even look like lesbians! I mean, come on, who is that going to appeal to?’, whilst 
another lesbian I knew described it as being a ‘total insult’. Perhaps somewhat inevitably, 
the end result was an obvious – and explicitly recognised – lack of lesbian participation in 
the Pride event itself. When I asked gay women I knew if they had attended, the replies 
were similar across the board: 
 
‘Why would I? What was there for me? Oh, let’s be honest, the whole thing was for the 
guys!’ (Meredith, promotions) 
 
‘It’s the same old story isn’t it? They pay lip service to us [lesbians], I suppose because 
they think they have to, but let’s be honest, there was hardly anything for women at 
all; a BBQ in someone’s garden, a meal in a restaurant . . . They basically gave us the 
crap left over after the boys had had their fun’ (Jo, lecturer) 
 
As a result, the images meant to depict lesbianism concretised and further substantiated the 
hegemonic terms of the normative gender paradigm precisely because they did not really 
equate to non-normative female sexuality at all. Lesbian participants with whom I worked in 
Sitges subsequently felt excluded before the event had even begun. In essence, the result of 
the proliferation of such representations was two-fold; firstly it meant that lesbianism was 
rendered invisible at the level of public discourse at exactly the same moment that the 
opposite was being said to have been achieved. Secondly, the problem was intensified at 
the level of the relating-individual, because recognition is not just about identity in a 
theoretical guise, whether discussed in terms of embodiment or otherwise; identity is never 
solely about constructing and negotiating a categorical description of ‘who you are’ or to 
determine ‘whom others might be’; because to do so also defines a template for interaction, 
a basis for the way that people treat one another. And re-signifying feminine lesbianism as 
an extension of female heterosexuality not only (inevitably) impacted on the way that 
women claiming an exclusively homosexual identity negotiated their social participation 
within the town, but may also potentially impact upon the way that all women are treated 
more generally. 
 
Conclusion 
And so to conclude: my point is simple. It may well be tempting to think that lesbians have 
equality, recognition achieved, on the basis of the supposed tolerance of the kinds of 
images made visible and perpetuated through the medium and marketing of films like Black 
Swan, which are then replicated to convey a similar sentiment in the promotion of places 
like Sitges as ‘cosmopolitan’. What I am arguing, however, is that whenever and wherever 
this does occur, we have to be completely and utterly certain that inequalities are not 
simply being reiterated at the exact moment the opposite is being said to have been 
achieved; to be certain that is, that in perpetuating and celebrating such representations we 
are not all simply hiding behind the faces of white masks. 
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Notes 
1. For elaborations of the ‘creative class’/‘creative city’, see Florida, 2002; Landry, 2000. 
2. This idea was also prominent within Richard Florida’s work in which he (not 
uncontroversially) posited a ‘gay index’, wherein a relatively high proportion of gay people 
living in an area was deemed to be vital to attract the creative classes, constituting a visible 
sign of openness and tolerance that he believed they sought (Florida, 2005). 
3. See, for examples: Case, 1993; Davis and Kennedy, 1992; Nestle, 1987, 1992. 
4. Shakira is a Columbian singer, renowned for her sexually provocative ‘belly dance’ dance 
style. 
5. Within this context, the word ‘filthy’ operated colloquially to suggest an overt – and not 
necessarily negatively valued – sexual liberalism, most commonly associated with women. 
6. Jennifer Aniston is an American actress who became famous worldwide in the 1990s 
playing a lead role in the globally successful American TV show Friends. 
7. See Fraser, 1997: 23–24, 189; Fraser and Honneth, 2003; Young, 2000: 105. 
8. Fraser’s example of homosexual politics sparked debate with Judith Butler, who accused 
her of ‘neo-conservatism’ and suggested that Fraser’s analysis dismissed the oppression of 
lesbians and gays as ‘merely cultural’, a charge that Fraser, however, vehemently denied. 
See Butler, 1997; Fraser, 1998. 
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